By Lloyd E. Stagner and TRAINS Magazine

Locomotive runs were further extended in 1942. On April 4, Nos. 3-4 were handled with one 4-8-4 between Los Angeles and Newton, 1591 miles. The engine arriving Newton on No. 4 at 11:25 a.m. turned back on No. 3 at 7:20 p.m. Some evidence of the reliability of the 3765/3776 classes en gines is that only on four occasions between June 1 and November 30 was the engine arriving on No. 4, which was frequently late, unable to return on No. 3 the same day. In an effort to improve utilization further, effective May 23, 3751's handling Nos. 1-2 and 23-24 operated through between Los Angeles and Kansas City, 1775 miles on Nos. 1-2 and an additional 12 miles on Nos. 23-24, which operated via Fullerton, Calif, instead of Pasadena. The through engine run on Nos. 3-4 was also extended to Kansas City on November 30.

With the heavy wartime traffic commencing after December 7, 1941, Santa Fe attempted to obtain more motive power, both steam and diesel from the War Production Board, which had assumed control of locomotive production and allocation. In February 1942, a request for 20 4-8-4's was made, but approval was not forthcoming until November. In February 1943, WPB increased this order to 30 engines. Designated the 2900 class, Nos. 2900-2929 (construction Nos. 69788-69817) cost $252,335.71 each, or about 50 per cent more than the 3776's. Although roller bearing side rods were requested, they were not approved. There were no changes in design details from the existing 3776's, but the use of heavier metal, including carbon steel, instead of nickel steel boilers increased their weight to 510,700 pounds, making the 2900's the heaviest 4-8-4's ever constructed. Weight on driving wheels increased from 281,900 to 295,000 pounds, which had the beneficial effect of making them better freight power and, after 1949, tonnage ratings were increased from 250 to 400 tons from the 3765/3776 classes on the Middle Division. Throughout their short career, the 2900's were generally considered to be the best of the 4-8-4 fleet.

No. 2900 arrived on the Santa Fe in late October 1943 and instructions were issued that the 30 new engines would be used exclusively in Argentine-Clovis through freight service, replacing Mikado power. Santa Fe had been plagued with motive-power shortages during 1943, and at a hearing on June 16-17, W. F. Kirk of the Office of Defense Transportation stated that the power had not been properly distributed. Santa Fe management countered that more power, both diesel and steam, was needed, and no doubt the strategic location of the AT&SF and boiler water problems in Arizona resulted in its allocation of about 50 per cent of EMD's FT production (Atlantic Coast Line, Denver & Rio Grande Western, Northern Pacific, Southern, and Western Pacific all entered objections). By mid-1944, 68 FT's, 30 4-8-4's, 25 2-10-4's, and 8 secondhand 2-8 + 8-2's obtained from the Norfolk & Western* had the power situation under control. For the balance of the war, more trouble was experienced with manpower shortages than motive power.

Officials were pleased with the new 2900's. Middle Division Superintendent Henry Arnold reported to Assistant General Manager Claude Cravens that on its second trip westbound, No. 2900 handled the 77 loads, 15 empties, Arnold's business car, and a caboose, totaling 4900 tons, of SA-33-Q, from Emporia to Wellington, Kans., 113 miles, in 4 hours, including three stops of 34 minutes. On the .4 per cent grade from Bazar to Matfield Green, the speed was 33.2 mph and the top speed was 49.3 mph for 6 miles west of East Junction. Since officials were aboard, Engineer J. C. Francis was careful to keep the speed under the 50-mph limit.

The last 2900 arrived in June 1944. All 30 engines were assigned to the Pecos Division, with maintenance handled at Clovis. No. 2919 was selected for road testing with a dynamometer car in May, making three round trips between Argentine and Clovis, 637 miles, and one round trip to Cushing, Okla., where a pipeline terminal was furnishing about 200 tank cars of oil daily to be handled to the East Coast. On the Cushing trip, No. 2919 took 114 cars of oil, 6005 tons, out of Arkansas City through to Argentine, with a helper from Arkansas City to Hackney, 7 miles of .6 per cent grade. The maximum recorded drawbar horsepower of 4590 was only marginally better than the 3766, but with the larger and heavier tender, cylinder horsepower was upped to 5600 from 5450. During July 1944, 2900's handled 304 freight trains over the Middle Division and were also powering the Chief between Kansas City and La Junta, as the railroad made every effort to keep its crack train on 1 time.

Some evidence of how the 4-8-4's were helping to win the war is gleaned from locomotive mileage and repair costs for September 1944. The 30 2900's averaged 9056 miles per engine and cost 15.08 cents per mile to maintain. This was very good mileage for predominately freight service at a time of slow schedules and maximum tonnage. The 14 3751's assigned between Kansas City and Los Angeles, via Amarillo, averaged 15,033 miles and cost 28 cents a mile to maintain. Eleven 3765's in the K.C.-L.A. passenger pool, two of which were assigned via Amarillo, averaged 17,652 miles and had a repair cost of 29.43 cents per mile, and the 10 3776's assigned between La Junta and Los Angeles, but frequently operating to Kansas City, ran an average of 14,185 miles at a cost of 33.12 cents per mile.

One serious accident occurred with the 4-8-4's during the war. On the night of July 3, 1944, No. 3774 was making up time with the westbound Chief. On a 1.1 per cent descending grade near Maine, Ariz., the 4-8-4 overturned on a 55-mph curve at a speed estimated at 90 mph. Four passengers and the fireman were killed; 113 passengers and 13 employees were injured. Twelve cars of the 14-car train derailed, and three cars were damaged beyond repair. The Interstate Commerce Commission blamed the accident on "excessive speed on a curve, as a result of failure of the railroad to provide adequate safeguards to prevent excessive speed on curves." This conclusion was based on the fact that the speed limit sign was located where it could not be seen until within 300 feet of its location, and the maximum speed east of the curve was 90 mph.